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The conflict between federal government treaties and state
voter initiative legislation, at first, seems to be an arcane scholarly
curiosity, one that presents novel questions of competing
sovereignty. Presently, the United States is rapidly moving
toward greater adherence to global institutions' needs for
predictable trade norms. Simultaneously, the re-empowerment of
states with formerly federal areas of regulation has reflected voter
frustration with federal administrative inadequacy. Treaty
mechanisms for trade protection will generate more conflicts with
the preferences of individual states as the trend towards the
empowerment of states develops.
This Article posits that the federal executive branch's constitu-
tional authority to make treaties and the federal Senate's role to
consent to treaties override the voting power of state citizens who
wish to control aspects of the international commerce in goods.
The challenge to the state laws is likely to be most visible when
exporting nations use the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade ("GATT")1 dispute mechanisms to challenge California's
controversial product labeling laws.
International commerce continues to integrate at a rapid pace.2
Nations are challenging non-tariff trade barriers more frequently
in international tribunals as national sanitary protections are
replacing tariffs as a means of excluding competitors. The world's
* Adjunct Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati. B.A., Boston
College, 1969; J.D., University of Virginia, 1974.
1 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11,
T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
2 United States import and export trade in manufactured goods has
increased steadily. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
OF THE UNITED STATES 818 (114th ed., 1994) [hereinafter STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT].
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new trading arrangements do not merely disfavor dis-integrative
local impositions on trade, but exclude them as well.3 Congres-
sional compromises over U.S. acceptance of the Uruguay Round
of GATT structured but did not eliminate this jeopardy to state
laws.4
Within the United States, if state voter initiatives clash with
the Constitution, or with the nation's international trade
obligations as established by treaties, the state initiative legislation
must recede.5 California's eccentric 1986 labeling initiative, voter-
approved "Proposition 65 "6 requiring product warnings and
imposing privately-enforced penalties, will be an important test
case of treaty supremacy in the coming years.
The states as a "laboratory of democracy" at the state ballot
box have produced an unusual mixture of laws over the years.
The California initiative produced a disclosure scheme impacting
thousands of imported and domestic goods. When import trade,
state sovereignty, cancer fears, and the environment clash, the
result makes for interesting new legal disputes: will the engine of
world commerce and global trade politics be strong enough to
outpower one state's novel scheme?
Section 2 of this Article sets the groundwork for the potential
conflict between state law and international treaty obligations.
Section 3 examines the substantive and procedural aspects of
California's Proposition 65. Section 4 discusses principles of
' See generally Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateial Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS
OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter
Final Act] establishing the World Trade Organization in furtherance of the
general goals of liberalizing world trade and eliminating domestic barriers
thereto).
' See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, S 103 (codified
at 19 U.S.C. § 3512 (1994)) (establishing a dispute settlement mechanism to
resolve conflicts that may arise between state law and the Uruguay Round
agreements).
' The rules of statutory construction apply to the initiative statute. See
Center for Pub. Interest Law v. Fair Political Practices Comm'n, 259 Cal. Rptr.
21, 26 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989). However, the presumption of constitutionality
will lead the court to adopt an interpretation that avoids rendering the statute
unconstitutional. See 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION S 45.11 (5th ed. 1992).
6 See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.1 (West 1992). The law was
adopted as a ballot measure enumerated as "Proposition 65" on the 1986 general
election ballot. See generally ROGER L. CARRICK, SURVIVING PROPOSITION 65
(1987) (providing historical background on the measure).
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federal pre-emption doctrine and reasons why they, in themselves,
have not rendered Proposition 65 unenforcable. Section 5
explores the theoretical implications of the GATT and WTO on
domestic laws. Section 6 predicts the ways that these principles
might actually be applied by WTO panels. Finally, Section 7
foresees an inevitable collision between the principles discussed in
the previous sections and suggests that the results of this conflict
will shape the future of federalism, government regulation, and
international trade.
2. BACKGROUND OF THE DEBATE
2.1. The Role of Treaty Obligations
Many treaties are international agreements used to speed up
and simplify trade in commercial goods. World trade has
increasingly been subject to tariff reduction or elimination treaties
that promote the free flow of goods among nations. The recently-
formed World Trade Organization ("WTO"), an outgrowth of
seven years of negotiation under GATT's Uruguay Round,8 fo:
example, is the most far-reaching affirmation of the importance of
a global view of trade for the United States.9 GATT opened U.S.
markets to consumer goods made in every other signatory
nation."0 Multinational decisions made in the form of global
treaties and bilateral agreements will dominate the twenty-first
century regulatory obligations of producers and exporters with
respect to topics such as labeling and bans of certain ingredients.
' See Final Act, supra note 3, art. I ("The World Trade Organization (here-
inafter referred to as 'the WTO' is hereby established."); see also id. arts. Il-V,
VII-VII (establishing the scope, functions, structure, budget, and general legal
status of the WTO).
' See generally JEFFREY SCHOTT & JOHANNA W. BuURMAN, THE
URUGUAY ROUND: AN ASSESSMENT (1994) (detailing the events and contours
of the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations).
9 See generally ROBERT HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE
LAW: THE EVOLUTION OF THE MODERN GATT LEGAL SYSTEM (1993); 2
LAW & PRACTICE OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (Joseph Dennin
ed., 1995) [hereinafter LAW & PRACTICE].
10 See GATT, supra note 1, art. IE (establishing generally the principle of
national treatment: once goods have been imported into one GATT member
nation from another, the receiving nation may not discriminate between the
imported goods and domestically produced goods); see generally KENNETH N.
DAM, THE GATT: LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION
(1970).
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Under the Constitution, the President is assigned the task of
negotiating international treaties, subject to the advice and consent
of the Senate." Treaties have special status; they become the law
of the United States under Article VI, Clause 2 of the Constitu-
tion.12 A decision that a treaty should contain certain provisions
regarding trade, for example, would probably generate consider-
able political conflict within the Senate. The Senate has the
authority to decide whether to ratify a treaty 3 and then both
Houses of Congress enact the necessary implementing legisla-
tion. 4
This treaty power is part of the national government's
constitutional duties, a power that the Tenth Amendment did not
reserve to the states by the Tenth Amendment."5 Federal courts
have exclusive jurisdiction over cases arising under international
treaties.16 Treaties are contracts between the United States and
another nation.'7 They ordinarily pre-empt any state law to the
contrary, especially state laws that hinder operation of an
international treaty.19 In effect, a treaty trumps state law that
adopts a contrary requirement.
" See U.S. CONST. art. II, S 2, cl. 2.
12 See id. art. VI, cl. 2; see also Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24, 29 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 835 (1976) ("A United States treaty is a contract
with another nation which under art. VI, cl.2 of the Constitution becomes a
law of the United States.").
"3 See U.S. CONST. art. I.
14See, e.g., Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat.
4814 (1994) (codified at 19 U.S.C. 3512 (1994)).
" See U.S. CONST. amend. X; Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 18 (1957) (stating
that "to the extent that the United States can validly make treaties, the people
and the states have delegated their power to the National Government and the
Tenth Amendment is no barrier").
16 See 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1994).
17 See Von Finck, 534 F.2d at 29 (holding that a "United States treaty is a
contract with another nation which under Art. VI, cl. 2 of the Constitution
becomes a law of the United States").
'" See Oneida Indian Nation v. New York, 691 F.2d 1070, 1088 (2d Cir.
1982) (stating that under the Supremacy Clause, "treaties entered into by
Congress were binding on the states and paramount to any conflicting acts on
the part of their legislatures").
" See In re Air Crash in Bali, Indonesia, 684 F.2d 1301, 1309 (9th Cir.
1982) (holding that California state law was pre-empted to the extent it would
prevent the operation of an international treaty).
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2.2. Communicating About Risks
This Article addresses an unusual variant on the toxicological
principle that "the dose makes the poison." 20 Toxicologists
calculate the risk of cancer from product exposure to or misuse of
certain chemicals; in some cases, the assessment of risk is so high
that the government opts to regulate by compelling protective
measures such as warning labels. The presence and composition
of chemicals in a formulated product can be determined by
analysis. The mere presence of a chemical is not properly equated
with risk of cancer or other hazards to human users of a prod-
uct.
21
Risk assessment 2' precedes risk communication in most
rational systems. We entrust the communication task to commu-
nicators after the health experts have assessed the level of risk.
The gasoline in one's car is both poisonous and explosive; to
communicate that the car's driver will die from proximity to
gasoline is foolish. Once the chemical's exposure and other
factors are calculated, a decision can be made on whether the
product presents a risk. 3 This accurate and important informa-
tion about product risk can be communicated by many means,
including public education campaigns and product labels.
This Article addresses an example of a state-required risk
20 RONALD E. GOTS, ToXIc RISKS: SCIENCE, REGULATION, AND
PERCEPTION 40 (1993).
", See id. at 4142 (discussing the relationship between dose and toxicity);
SHELDON KRIMSKY & ALONZO PLOUGH, ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS:
COMMUNICATING RISKS AS A SOCIAL PROCESS 27-28 (1988) (noting that
instead of being entirely objective, assessment of risk "provides a more formal
statement of a group's underlyin assumptions about the nature of envi-
ronmental hazards and the levefs of economic/health tradeoffs that is
considered acceptable"); see generally W. KIP VISCUSI ET AL., LEARNING ABOUT
RISK (1988) (discussing differences in consumer perceptions of risk and actual
risk assessments).
2 Risk assessment in the federal system includes U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency cancer risk assessment guidance. See 51 Fed. Reg. 34000
(1988).
" Controversies about the probabilities and extent of injuries that a
product may cause are usually resolved by expert witness testimony. See
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 580 (1993)
(holding that "[f]aced with a proffer of expert scientific testimony, then, the
trial ju dge must determine at the outset.., whether the expert is proposing to
testify to (1) scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to
understand or determine the issue").
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communication that is imposed on any imported or domestic
product sold in California. Proposition 65 requires a label
warning once chemicals are listed as subject to warnings because
of the laboratory finding of potential cancer effects in animals. 24
Under California's approach, a statutory duty to communicate is
established, prima facie and subject to any defenses, by the
detectable chemical presence in the product.' The resulting label
requirements pose a significant problem for U.S. and non-U.S.
marketers alike: the identical product lawfully sold in the forty-
nine other states must either be labeled with a drastic, risk-
announcing label or be kept out of California. What products are
affected and what ingredients will next be listed are key facts, not
readily identified by observers far distant from California.
Scholars of the phenomenon of health risk have extensively
studied how the public responds to communications about risk.26
For the more severe risks, it is more likely that a public safety
entity such as a government health agency will ban the ingredi-
ent,' or require that information about the risk be included on
product labels. 2' The governmental decision to impose "warn-
ing" labels reflects the protective determination of public health
officials that information is the optimal solution to the reduction
of public risk.
The quandary that results from this set of choices is a difficult
one for the product marketer: where two or more regulators take
different risk assessment views, risk communication is forced to
satisfy the demands of the regulator who is most stringent even if
the majority of other regulators do not share that extreme view.
The risk communication purpose is especially important when a
marketer designs the messages that will fit on a particular
product's label. Multiple risk warning label decisions, made
24 See AFL-CIO v. Deukmejian, 260 Cal. Rptr. 479 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989)
(ordering the relevant state agency to include animal carcinogens in addition to
chemicals that cause cancer in humans under Proposition 65 principles).
2 See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE S 25249.6 (West 1992).
26 See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOwARD
EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION (1992); W. KIP VISCUSI, PRODUCT RISK
LABELING: A FEDERAL RESPONSIBILITY (1993); BARUCH FISCHHOFF ET AL.,
ACCEPTABLE RISK (1981).
27 See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1001 (1996) (describing bans on asbestos prod-
ucts in occupational settings).
21 See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. pt. 1500 (1996) (setting forth Consumer Product
Safety Commission regulations on labeling of hazardous products).
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locally at various times and with various wordings, are likely to
conflict directly with the desire in international trade for efficient
and multinational product labels. Where punitive local additions
skew the variation in risk communications, inconsistent demands
confront the label designer. Particular issues arise for internation-
al exporters when local warning commands affect their product
sales in the United States by imposing unpredicted liabilities
which most California-based competitors were able to anticipate
and avoid.
2.3. Product Labels and Trade Issues
Making product users aware of information relevant to
protection of human health can reduce real risks. One important
trade-related aspect of private solutions to public risk concerns is
the decision to use multilingual product labels, a choice for
marketers selling products in more than one nation to make.
Only a finite amount of consumer product label space is available.
Thus, labeling information tends to be compressed to allow, for
example, English, Spanish, and French wording on a product sold
throughout North America. The amount of content that can be
communicated on the same label decreases as the languages of the
label messages increase.
Uniformity of content of the label statements is essential to
receiving cost efficiencies in packaging and distribution of
consumer goods. The challenges for non-U.S. marketers of
consumer products will intensify if treaty protections for
imported products are not able to assure uniformity of labeling.
The number of local variants on product label information must
be necessarily reduced as multiple national requirements are
imposed on the same label. There is a tension between local
desires for product label variations, and the interests of an efficient
international economy. Trade in consumer goods across national
and state boundaries is expanding rapidly.29 Information that is
of interest to consumers in one corner of the globe, if it must also
be communicated to all others who receive the labeled product,
will add costs to purchasers elsewhere who do not share that
locality's concern. A unitary label for a product offers a signifi-
cant distribution cost advantage over multiple segregated streams
29 See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 2, at 818.
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of differently-labeled products that present information desired by
local consumers.30
2.4. Illustrating the Label Preference Concerns
The distinction between a warning based on preferences and
one based on reasoned scientific consensus, is reminiscent of the
similar distinction drawn by a federal appellate court in 1996.31
A Vermont labeling statute32 required the announcement on
dairy products of the presence of the biotechnological feed
additive "rBST," but was not on its face a warning of adverse
effects. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals struck down the
state law in August 1996."3 Opponents of the mandatory label
framed the primary issue under First Amendment "compelled
speech" case law.34  The court drew a distinction between
product composition information that represented a legislature's
judgment about a "reasonable concern for human health or
safety," and the types of information that are nice to know but
can be determined by consumers' choice in marketplace deci-
35sions.
Vermont opponents of the chemical argued that rBST posed
human health concerns, but the federal agencies disagreed after
years of complex technical examinations of the human and animal
safety of the additive. 6  The appellate court differentiated
between the concern that some consumers felt, and the state's
governmental interest in safety of products.37  The court com-
mented in a footnote that the state government had taken no
30 See generally ABA, SECT. OF TORT & INSURANCE PRACTICE, PRODUCT
WARNINGS, INSTRUCTIONS AND USER INFORMATION (1994) (summarizing
product label warning studies).
31 See International Dairy Foods Ass'n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67 (2d Cir.
1996).
32 See VT. STAT. ANN., tit. IV, § 2754 (Supp. 1996).
31 See International Dairy Foods Ass'n, 92 F.3d at 74.
31 Compelled speech is suspect under First Amendment principles. See
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985). This
applies even in the context of a product label, which is "commercial speech."
See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,
562-3 (1980).
3 International Dairy Foods Ass'n, 92 F.3d at 73 n.1.
36 See id. at 73.
17 See id. at 74.
[Vol. 18:2
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol18/iss2/8
TREA TIES AND FEDERALISM
position on whether the chemical is beneficial or detrimental,"
but wanted consumers to know of the presence of the chemical.
The court held that the presence of rBST was an insufficient basis
on which to compel private persons to speak where First
Amendment rights existed.39
2.5. State Initiative Legislation
Most laws are adopted through normal channels of legislative
consideration, amendment, and compromise. But many states also
allow the public to vote on the adoption of laws through ballot
initiatives. While referendum authority for such topics as zoning
decisions is well understood,4° a number of states, such as
California, have gone far beyond the mundane, allowing initiative
votes on hundreds of controversial policy topics.41
State courts are required to construe the complex statutory
products of the initiative process, without legislative records or
reports, or colloquies of legislative sponsors that are sometimes
used to construe the terms of conventional statutes. 42 In practi-
cal terms, the difference is that courts cannot view initiative
legislation through the prism of legislative history, amendment,
and compromise, a view that sometimes is a useful tool of
construction in applying state laws. The drafters' lack of
precision in creating initiative legislation leaves the court to decide
whether, for example, the state law can be construed to avoid
conflicts with earlier or parallel federal requirements. 43
In construing a state statute, a state court often presumes that
38 See id.
39 See id.
" See J.R. Kemper, Annotation, Adoption of Zoning Ordinance or
Amendment Thereto Through Initiative Process, 72 A.L.R.3D 991, 993 (1976).
4 See Doug Willis, California Voters Love the Idea of Taking the Law into
Their Own Hands, AP, Apr. 14, 1997, available in WESTLAW, 1997 WL
2516499.
4' The rules of statutory construction apply to the initiative statute. See
Center for Pub. Interest Law, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 26.
43 See, e.g., Committee of Dental Amalgam Mfrs. & Distrib. v. Stratton, 92
F.3d 807, 810 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that Proposition 65 could be pre-empted
by federal act only where "all possible consumer product warnings that would
satisfy Proposition 65 conflict with provisions of the" act); Cf Rossi v. Brown,
889 P.2d 557, 559 (Cal. 1995) (finding conflict between voter initiative law and
state constitution only where state constitution expressly precludes the disputed
exercise of initiative power).
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the state legislature was aware of, and did not wish to conflict
with, an inconsistent federal statute.44 Though the case law is
sparse, one could posit that a court's scrutiny of the meaning of
an initiative's terms will be as great or as small as its deference to
legislation adopted through conventional means.4'
3. CALIFORNIA PROPOSITION 65
3.1. Illustrating the Treaty-Initiative Clash
The best current illustration of the clash of treaty rights and
state powers is a voter-adopted initiative statute that imposes an
explicit state-specific, chemical-specific set of words on packages of
many products sold at retail stores in California.' California
voters adopted the initiative proposal as Proposition 65, entitled
the "Safe Drinking Water and Toxics Enforcement Act of
1986,"' z on the 1986 ballot by almost a 2-to-1 margin.48  The
initiative was more stringent in its warning labels than the
legislature's conventional enactments on the same subject.49
Sponsors of the ballot initiative did not trust conventional
regulation systems for chronic risks such as cancer.5 ° Because
they believed that existing California regulation was inadequate,
51
they drafted and submitted Proposition 65 to the state's voters.5 2
44 See SINGER, supra note 5, S 45.11.
" See Rossi, 889 P.2d at 557.
46 See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 5 25249 (West 1992).
41 See "Restrictions on Toxic Discharges into Drinking Water; Requirement
of Notice of Persons' Exposure to Toxics. Initiative Statute," California Ballot
Pamphlet, General Election at G86 (Nov. 4, 1986) [hereinafter Proposition 65].
41 See Julie Anne Ross, Comment, Citizen Suits: California's Proposition 65
and the Lawyer's Ethical Duty to the Public Interest, 29 U.S.F. L. Rev. 809, 813
(1995).
41 See id. at 141 (stating that "our present toxic laws aren't tough enough").
50 See Judith A. DeFranco, California's Toxics Initiative: Making It Work, 39
HASTINGS L.J. 1195, 1199 (1988) (explaining risk related purposes of Proposi-
tion 65 advocates).
51 See John R. Emshwiller, California Ballot Proposal Would Give Citizens
a Role in Safeguarding Against Toxic Materials, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 1986, at
60.
51 See Proposition 65, supra note 47, § 1 (stating that "state government
agencies have failed to provide [people] with adequate protection"). The
sponsors justified their ballot language to the officials who review state ballot
language: "The purposes section makes it clear that the level of protection
against the risks of hazardous chemicals which is currently being provided by
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Advocates of the ballot initiative proposed labeling require-
ments, rather than an outright ban, as a control measure against
the sale of carcinogenic ingredients. One such mandatory label
reads: "WARNING: THIS PRODUCT CONTAINS A
CHEMICAL KNOWN TO THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
TO CAUSE BIRTH DEFECTS OR OTHER REPRODUCTIVE
HARM." 3 Implicit in this wording is the assumption that
consumers will refuse to buy a product so labeled when other
alternatives without such labels exist. This assumption presumes
that the other products on the retail shelf do in fact avoid the
exposure to detectable levels of the listed ingredient. The
requirement of such severe warnings gave Proposition 65 advo-
cates the strategic leverage to drive the hundreds of listed
chemicals out of the consumer market, through the predictable
avoidance by manufacturers of the stigma effect of negative labels.
It thus seems reasonable to infer that Proposition 65 support-
ers intended to make products unmarketable by requiring these
label warnings, thereby inducing marketers to reformulate the
product by deleting the chemicals in question. For example,
assume that the state officials chose to list ingredient ABC. Then
widgets with ingredient ABC that were put on sale in California
would need to change their labels to incorporate this warning.
The required label language is so harsh an addition that widget
makers would cease any use of ABC as an ingredient.
The California initiative's advocates specifically disagreed with
the adequacy of centralized control of product risk decisions.54
Product warning labels imposed under existing state laws and
federal laws such as the Toxic Substances Control Act,5 the
Consumer Product Safety Act 6 and the Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970' 7 were deemed not sufficient to protect
state agencies is not adequate." Letter from David Roe and Carl Pope,
Environmental Defense Fund, to Robert Burton, Deputy Attorney General 1
(Dec. 31, 1985) [hereinafter Letter].
13 CAL. CODE REGS., tit. 22, S 12601(b)(4) (1995).
51 See Proposition 65, supra note 47, S 1.
55 See 15 U.S.C. S 2601 (1994).
56 See 15 U.S.C. S 2051 (1994).
57 See 29 U.S.C. S 651 (1994); see also California Labor Fed'n, AFL-CIO v.
California Occupational Safety and Health Standards Bd., 271 Cal. Rptr. 310
(Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (finding that federal workplace safety requirements can be
augmented by state label warnings).
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Californians. The result was that a set of California-specific
warning labels, incorporating the state's assessment of certain
chemicals, would be required on all products sold in that state
that contain one of the hundreds of listed chemicals." The
compelled warning would be required even though the product
maker, federal government agencies, and other states did not agree
that the consumer product needed the same warning statement on
its labels. Disclaimer language is not acceptable under the
California scheme.
This compelled announcement of the state's opinion, triggered
by presence rather than risk, is a critical distinction. Regardless
of what Vermont, Korea, France, or the U.S. government believes
to be a product's consumer health risk, the product must bear the
words describing to consumers this state's opinion of the risk
posed by the presence of a chemical in this product. The other
states or nations considered and did not use the warning "this
product is a risk;" but one U.S. state puts its opinion of the
chemical on the label of the product, making mere presence of the
chemical subject to warning, as opposed to the actual risk of the
product.
3.2. What Proposition 65 Requires
Proposition 65 requires warning labels to be included on the
products which contain certain chemicals.?' A typical product
offered for sale in California, which has one of hundreds of
chemicals in its formula, will bear the label statement, "WARN-
ING: THIS PRODUCT CONTAINS A CHEMICAL KNOWN
TO THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA TO CAUSE BIRTH
DEFECTS OR OTHER REPRODUCTIVE HARM."61 If only
one such effect applies, the label need mention only that effect.
Scientific knowledge of the intricacies of birth defect and
cancer causation is evolving. Science knows much less about these
" See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, 5 12601 (1995).
59 See id.
10 See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.6 (West 1992). The law also
has a provision regarding environmental spills of chemicals into a source of
drinking water, a feature that is not addressed in this Article. See id.
61 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, 5 12601(b)(4) (1995).




TREA TIES AND FEDERALISM
chronic hazards than is known about easily-measured immediate
risks.63 Existing methodologies that measure acute risk can
calculate well the likelihood that a chemical will explode, catch
fire, or burn exposed skin. The California labels mandated by
Proposition 65 do not relate to acute risk warnings, but instead
apply to chemicals for which animal studies predict some
reproductive effect, such as lowered birth weight of rat offspring
when measured in a rodent feeding study." For example, if the
state determines that dihydrogen oxide causes a slower rate of
growth in rabbits than does a placebo dosage, products containing
dihydrogen oxide could be required to include the prominent
warning shown in the preceding paragraph.
The initiative legislation's trigger for warning is the simple
presence of the listed chemicals, not a showing of the causal
relationship between the chemicals in this quantity or path of
exposure and illnesses such as birth defects or cancer.65 This is
a distinction that sets Proposition 65 apart from federal labeling
systems. An acutely dangerous product that could burn or
directly injure the person is already the subject of universally
required warnings in the United States and Canada.66
The presence of the listed chemical is the triggering event for
the prima facie duty to label.6' For example, a paint manufactur-
er who makes paint in Maine must be certain that the cans it sells
in California bear a label giving the precise California-specific
words quoted above if the paint contains one or more of the
several hundred listed chemicals. An Ohio customer who reads
63 See, e.g., GOTS, supra note 20, at 94 (contrasting the limitations of
scientific knowledge in the search for "cancer-causing chemicals with the
availability of scientific data for identifying toxicity of industrial discharge).
64 See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, S 12306(e)(2), 12306(g)(2) (West 1992); see
also Paulette L. Stenzel, Right-to-Know Provisions of California's Proposition 65:
The Naivete of the Delaney Clause Revisited, 15 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 493, 503
(discussing the use of animal studies in assessing chemical risk for Proposition
65 purposes).
65 See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE S 25249.11(c) (West 1992). There is
an affirmative defense available to the litigation defendant who can assert the
level was one of "no significant risk," but this is a factual issue for the jury to
determine. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE S 25249.10(c).
" See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. pt. 1500 (1996); see generally JAMES O'RELLY,
COMPLYING WITH W.H.M.I.S.: THE U.S. MANUFACTURER'S GUIDE TO
CANADIAN CHEMICAL LABELING (1989) (describing Canada's system in detail).
67 See S 25249.11(c).
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the "known to California"68 label on an Ohio retail shelf is very
likely to select a product with a less alarming label; the alarming
words scare consumers and may even puzzle others.69
The federal government has not adopted such a universal
requirement for warning of cancer or reproductive effects, opting
instead for the more scientific approach of tying warnings about
the exposure of the chemical to its risk levels in products.70
Consequently, California requirements for labels on products will
be different than federal or other state norms for the labels of
products sold throughout the United States. Though other states
are free to impose labeling requirements relating to safety, such as
fire and flammability warnings and recycling information, none
have followed California's stringent approach. Comparable
legislative proposals in such states as Oregon,7 ' New York 2 and
Hawaii73 have failed. Ohio overwhelmingly rejected a Califor-
nia-style initiative drafted by the creator of Proposition 65 in
November 1992.' 4 As a result, California is the only venue that
requires a state-specific warning of chronic health effects on a
product otherwise lawfully labeled for marketing in the United
States, thereby rendering the product illegal for failure to describe
the presence of certain chemicals.
The parallels of the Vermont rBST litigation 5 to the Proposi-
tion 65 scheme include the fact that California's listing of
chemical names stands alone; listing is not related to specific levels
or risks of exposure that occur with a particular product. Private
litigants challenge products that contain detectable amounts of the
listed chemical. The defense can claim that "no significant risk"
level exists, but only as an affirmative defense for which the
68 See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, S 12601(b)(4) (1995).
69 See VIscusI ET AL., supra note 21, at 96 (noting that "if labels or other
information programs are constructed to force buyers to focus on the risks of
injury from a product, no matter how small (as long as they are positive), then
many consumers will avoid purchasing the product .... ").
70 See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. S 1910.1001 (1996) (describing regulation of asbestos
in products); see generally 16 C.F.R. pt. 1500 (1996) (cescribing regulation of
toxic effects of consumer products).
71 See S. 975, 64th Legis. Assembly (Or. 1987).
72 See Assembly 2273, 1989-90 Legis. Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1989).
73 See H.R. 52, 15th Legis. (Haw. 1989).
4 78% of Ohio's voters rejected ballot Issue 5 in the 1992 general election.




marketer bears full burdens of proof.76  While California resi-
dents may be exposed to many other sources of carcinogenic
chemicals, the only specific warnings imposed are those on
consumer products.77 Although the dose makes the poison,
California ties its law to presence and not to dose.
3.3. The Labeling Command for Imported Products
Non-California manufacturers and processors who market
their products inside California are legally liable for $2,500 per
day penalties78 if their product is sold or offered for sale in that
state without the expressly defined warning statement. 79  The
retail seller is liable as well, but larger California retailers have
obtained indemnification clauses in their purchasing contracts. 0
As a result, the total costs of the defense and penalty fall upon the
manufacturer.
To illustrate, a non-U.S. manufacturer of widgets who wishes
to sell to buyers anywhere in the United States must anticipate
that the widgets will move through channels of retail distribution,
including, perhaps, to California's huge market. The foreign
exporter must find a way to examine the current California list of
chemicals.8" The updated listing will include the names of
several hundred materials, some of which may be contaminants
present in a detectable quantity in the widgets. The duty of the
non-U.S. firm is to watch for new and revised listings, and to
measure for the intended and unintended presence of chemicals in
76 See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE S 25249.10(c) (West 1992).
7 See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.6 (imposing warning
requirement on persons "in the course of business"); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22,
S 12601(b)(5) (imposing warning requirement on any person "who manufac-
tures, produces, assembles, processes, handles, distributes, stores, sells or
otherwise transfers a consumer product").
78 See infra Section 3.4.
79 See S 25249.6.
80 Cf Jack D. Shumate & David K. Tillman, Proposition 65 - California
Law Becomes a National Problem, 67 MICH. B.J. 516, 517 (1988) (noting that the
threat of liability has led to a "rash of demands from California businesses for
certifications from manufacturers and suppliers that their products do not
contain any substance on the Proposition 65 list"); see also S 25249.11(0
(providing that regulations implementing S 25249.6 place an obligation to warn
"on the producer or packager rather than on the retail seller").
" The listings are amended frequently. For a description of the amendment
procedure, see CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, S 12101 (1997).
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its widgets. For any products that contain any detectable amount
of a listed chemical, such as toluene, the non-U.S. firm must then
place the English language label on the widget, "WARNING:
THIS PRODUCT CONTAINS A CHEMICAL KNOWN TO
THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA TO CAUSE BIRTH DE-
FECTS OR OTHER REPRODUCTIVE HARM."
8 2
It is the presence of a toxic substance such as lead, and not the
health risk of lead ingestion from a unit of product, that gives rise
to a prima facie legal duty to use a label warning." For example,
if a calcium supplement pill is made in Mexico from calcium
derived from seashells that were on the bottom of the ocean near
where ships and boats had used leaded gasoline and lead-based
preservative paints, the manufacturer would have an obligation to
label the product. The manufacturer would be under such a duty
because the calcium may thereby contain low levels of lead that
the supplement maker had not intentionally added to its pills.
3.4. Penalties for Non-Compliance
Violations of the California state requirements may result in
three consequences: a fine of $2,500 per day per violation;
attorney fees and cost awards to the successful challenger; and a
court order to re-label or re-formulate the units still on sale.84
Additional consequences may result from the inclusion of other
collateral claims.8 5
In measuring and awarding an actual amount of damages in a
Proposition 65 case, a judge or jury would probably consider
factors such as fair notice, good faith, and ability to recapture
products shipped before the deadline that are sold after the
effective date. The foreign manufacturer whose product contains
an unintended contaminant (like the lead in the calcium pills
82 S 12601(b)(4).
83 See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE S 25249.6 (West 1992).
14 See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODES 25249.7 (West 1992). It is unsettled
law whether the $2,500 per day penalty can be multiplied by the number of
exposures to individuals, by the number of units, or by some other factor.
81 Plaintiffs may also allege violations of the Unfair Practices Act, thereby
generating additional liability of up to $2,500 a day beyond the Proposition 65
penalties. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE 5 17200 (West 1997). The statute of
limitations for claims of unfair trade practices is four years, while the statute
of limitations for Proposition 65 violations is just one year. See CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE S 17208 (West 1997); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE S 340 (West 1997).
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described above) would have to pay $912,500 per year86 plus
$100,000 in legal fees. In order to obey the law, the manufacturer
may have to change its calcium source so as to avoid using
seashells with low amounts of lead in them.
3.5. Compliance Activity Needed to Avoid Violation
For the non-U.S. manufacturer, obtaining copies of the
California label warning regulations and the periodically updated
Proposition 65 lists of chemicals will be just the beginning. One
who wishes to comply must also have technical advisors skilled in
toxicology who can discern from the literature studies, whether
consumer product contaminants and unintended migration of
chemicals may result in detection in the product of a newly-
discovered chemical, from whose presence there arises a labeling
requirement. A chemical need not be intentionally present; it is
the surprise detection of one of the hundreds of contaminants
within one's product that ambushes the unwary manufacturer.
Unfortunately, the information gap between large and small
companies in dealing with Proposition 65 is vast because of the
scientific resources needed to remain aware of the detectability of
contaminants and to remain up to date on the state's listings of
chemicals. Few of the smaller non-U.S. marketers could afford
the U.S. legal fees to litigate a massive penalty case and thereby
risk the $912,500 per year in penalties, in addition to reformula-
tion expenses; thus the pressure to settle is enormous.
Non-U.S. manufacturers likewise have an information deficit
that puts them at greater risk. Another nation whose chemical
safety agency does not regulate the particular chemical is not
likely to be on notice that one of the fifty U.S. states has the
chemical on its list. A French-made product may comply with
French and European Union requirements, and probably with
U.S. government standards, but the surprise appearance of a
different risk assessment and different risk communication demand
would force the French company to pay a settlement, or else play
on California bounty hunters' favorable terms in one of the state's
superior courts.
86 $2,500 multiplied by 365 days.
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3.6. Enforcement by Private Bounty Hunter Suits
Part of the extraordinary impact that Proposition 65 has had
on marketing in the United States has resulted from the drafters'
chosen vehicle of case law enforcement. By paying a twenty-five
percent "bounty" from the $912,500 annual fine to anyone who
sues and wins as a private enforcer,87 the mini-industry of bounty
hunter enforcement was born. More than 600 cases have been
filed since the law went into effect in February 1988, and the great
majority have been settled for cash payments made by manufac-
turers to private lawyers."
A public policy difficulty inherent in any bounty hunter
arrangement is that case selection, definitional precedents, and
statutory interpretation issues are all vested in a private person
who has a strong cash incentive to bring cases that return the best
payout. By analogy, the bounty hunter of the Old West might
have profited when a bank robber was arrested, thereby diverting
public attention to the capture of bank robbers, even though
society's priorities might have placed murderers first on the most
wanted list. The reward-incentive system introduces systemic
distortions even greater than the flawed citizen suit system of
private enforcement of federal environmental laws.89
The California system does not assign a public priority to each
lawsuit brought for enforcement. A few lawsuits are investigated
and initiated by the state Attorney General; the vast majority
involve no public official. The initiative drafters' choice of
bounty hunter mechanisms, "in order to create new incentives for
enforcement," 0 places enforcement into the hands of any person
who wishes to sue any foreign or domestic producer or marketer
who fails to comply with the law. The creation of cash incentives
for the collection of twenty-five percent of any penalties and for
settlements with large attorney fee awards has induced litigants,
s See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25192 (West 1992).
88 The State Attorney General's office maintains the only log of Proposi-
tion 65 litigation, and because the payment in settlement rate is so high, few
reported court decisions have arisen.
89 See MICHAEL GREVE AND FRED SMITH JR., ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS:
PUBLIC COSTS, PRIVATE REWARDS 115 (1992) (providing detailed analysis of
the defects in the citizen suit structure).
10 Letter, supra note 52, at 3.
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including the groups that sponsored the drafting effort,91 to
search for violations.
The practical effect is that multi-defendant lawsuits for alleged
failure to label the same chemical, brought against many producers
of the same class of products, have proven to be extremely
lucrative sources of settlement income for the bounty hunters. 92
The use of private profit incentives as an alternative to conven-
tional public enforcement has worked as initiative drafters had
intended, to induce the filing of the vast majority of Proposition
65 cases. In turn, settlement of cases between private plaintiffs
and corporate defendants has made compliance efforts more
difficult, for the norms of compliance are set forth in consent
decrees and not in public processes such as rulemaking.
4. FEDERAL PRE-EMPTION
4.1. State Laws and Rules
Federal pre-emption claims by U.S. firms have not been
successful in Proposition 65 cases for two reasons. First, some
product categories regulated by federal laws lack a sufficiently
clear federal statutory provision that establishes pre-emption of
label warning contents. Second, in other cases with a stronger
statutory argument for the labeler, pre-emption has been defeat-
ed93 because of a loophole in state regulations that allows retail
store shelf labeling to complement, or substitute for, the on-
package label.94
Advocates of the California system have successfully asserted
91 Arguments in support of Proposition 65 were presented on behalf of the
Environmental Defense Fund and alied organizations. See id. After the law
was passed, the Environmental Defense Fund, along with others, brought an
action for violations of Proposition 65 against a paint-stripper manufacturer.
See Dennis Pfaff, Plaintiffs Attorneys and "Bounty Hunters" Are Taking the
Initiative in Enforcing Proposition 65, CAL. LAW., Aug. 1995, at 42.
92 See Judy Stringer, Manufacturers Settle Big with Activist Group, CHEM.
WK., Apr. 24, 1996, available in WESTLAW, 1996 WL 923720 (discussing a
$1.1 million settlement by several California activist groups of numerous suits
brought under Proposition 65).
9' See Chemical Specialties Mfrs. Ass'n v. Allenby, 958 F.2d 941 (9th Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 825 (1992) (holding that alternate forms of labeling
undercut claims of federal label pre-emption). But see Ingredient Communica-
tion Council, Inc. v. Lungren, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 216 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (finding
that alternates to label warning not accepted by state).
94 See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, S 12601(b)(1)(B) (1995).
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that federal label requirements can be augmented, at least in
theory; by a multitude of posted signs at the point of purchase of
every product in each retail outlet in California." Under this
line of reasoning, if shelf posting is uniformly successful, the
required state label does not "conflict" with federal label exclusivi-
ty. Federal courts have struggled to avoid the constitutional
conflicts that would arise if pre-emption of the state initiative law
were declared.96 California courts have a similar desire to avoid
unconstitutional outcomes.97
The avoidance of pre-emption by in-store shelf warnings is a
useful legal defense but the reality is that no reasonable retail
marketer in California would place thousands of product-specific
signs in proximity to the shelves where the manufacturer's
product is displayed to customers.98 One alternative warning
method, using in-store signs and a telephone call-in number, was
rejected because of very small use of the system by consumers.99
Still, the defenders of Proposition 65 may use the potential in-
store option, regardless of its feasibility, to forestall pre-emption
based on label costs. They have asserted successfully that courts
need not reach issues of constitutional pre-emption, since an
alternative system of warnings could, in theory, be utilized."
The loophole has provided a comfortable legal fiction, to assert
that because an option could be utilized with cooperation of
retailers, the daunting questions of federalism and labeling pre-
95 See id. S 12601.
96 See Committee of Dental Amalgam Mfrs. & Distrib. v. Stratton, 92 F.3d
807, 810 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that FDA medical device law is not pre-
emptive unless all possible warnings conflict); Industrial Truck Ass'n v. Henry,
909 F. Supp. 1368, 1377-78 (S.D. Cal. 1995) (permitting no pre-emption of state
labeling requirements in the absence of express federal standards).
9' See, e.g., San Francisco Unified School Dist. v. Johnson, 479 P.2d 669
(Cal. 1971).
98 See Ingredient Communication Council v. Lungren, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 216
(Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (stating that warning systems are not "clear and reasonable
per se by virtue of their mere existence").
" See Ingredient Communication Council, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 1495 (finding
insufficient a system using in-store signs and a toll-free number to give Propo-
sition 65 warnings due to "critical evidence set forth at trial ... that in its first
year of operation the ... system provided a total of only 488 taped telephone
warning messages to California consumers").
"o See, e.g., Committee of Dental Amalgam, 92 F.3d at 809 (stating that
"the fact that the . . . Act might operate unconstitutionally under some
conceivable set of circumstances is insufficient to render it wholly invalid").
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emption may be avoided.
4.2. Federal Pre-emption of State Tort Cases
The federal pre-emption case law of private tort cases is in
flux, but Supreme Court decisions in 1992 and 1996 set a
threshold that makes pre-emption of Proposition 65 by conven-
tional statutory theories more doubtful. In Cipollone,10 1 the
Court's careful parsing of pre-emptive language in federal cigarette
labeling provisions impliedly disfavors opponents of state label
warning laws.102
The state courts' medical device products liability claims are
not pre-empted by the federal Medical Device Amendments of
1976.103 Pre-emption would involve hundreds of millions of
dollars in lessened liability exposure for manufacturers. In 1996,
the Supreme Court ruled in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr'° that
federal statutory language pre-empting state "requirements"0 '
did not also pre-empt the indirect requirements resulting from
adverse verdicts in state tort cases.' 6 Consequently, such a tort
damage award could indirectly force manufacturers to move away
from using federally accepted label terms toward use of narrower
warnings.'07
The Supreme Court's direction seems to be that state court
damages claims of injury are not pre-empted by vague federal
statutes, because they are not a "requirement."0 8 Applying this
logic, a law that operates by lawsuits rather than by substantive
administrative rules, like Proposition 65, would not usually be
pre-empted since the bounty hunter's violation charge is not itself
101 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
102 See id. at 518 (stating that federal statutory provisions must be construed
"in light of the presumption against the pre-emption of state police power
regulations").
103 See 21 U.S.C. S 360 (1994).
1"4 See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S.Ct. 2240 (1996).
105 21 U.S.C. S 360k (1994).
C6 See Lohr, 116 S.Ct. at 2240.
107 See id. at 2240 (noting that "additional elements of the state-law cause
of action would make the state requirements narrower, not broader, than the
federal requirement").
101 Id. at 2240 (reasoning that general federal regulatory statutes are unlike
more specific regulation which is "designed to protect from potentially
contradictory state requirements").
1997]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
a rule of the state. The federal acceptance of a certain chemical
risk level, while California awards damages for a lower level of
the same chemical, demonstrates an inconsistency of the federal
and state systems. However, this inconsistency does not result in
invalidation under the Lohr analysis.
4.3. Federal Pre-emption and the Bounty Hunter
Pre-emption is often tied to existence of a state "require-
ment."' °9 The federal pre-emption that applies to the imposition
of a state regulation on such issues as package net weight ° is
different from the pre-emption claim that would apply when a
private enforcer, acting as a "private attorney general," seeks
statutory penalties. The California enforcement case is very much
like a civil damages action, albeit with no showing of injury. The
general public acts only as a bystander in the Proposition 65 case;
half of the payment in settlement or after trial goes to public
agencies."'
The degree of private control and involvement in Proposition
65 cases is a significant factor that relates to the above discussed
Supreme Court cases.' This law's novel enforcement scheme
imposes a non-governmental penalty collection system, and the
privately-induced litigation scheme is not a state "requirement" as
it applies to a product in a Proposition 65 case. The Cipollone
and Lohr decisions, which have suggested that statutes pre-empting
state requirements do not also preclude private tort suits, become
more significant when the enforcement system moves farther
away from conventional state regulation-writing. It was the
inadequacy of conventional regulatory methods'13  that led
proponents to radically alter the enforcement system in Proposi-
tion 65.1 4 That radical alteration has made federal pre-emption
109 Id.
"' See generally Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977) (discussing
differences between state and federal requirements for net weights on labels).
" See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE S 25192(a) (West 1992). Many
Proposition 65 suits brought by activist groups have settled with "contribution"
payments to those groups, along with fee awards to counsel. See, e.g., Stringer,
supra note 92.
n See supra Section 4.3.
13 See Proposition 65, supra note 47, § 1 (asserting that "state government
agencies have failed to provide [people] with adequate protection).
114 See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE S 25249.7 (West 1992).
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on statutory grounds unlikely.
5. THE GATT ARGUMENTS
The GATT binds the United States government to enforceable
rules of trading and customs tariffs on products that are shipped
across international boundaries.1 15  The typical consumer prod-
uct sold in stores from California to Maine is likely to contain a
foreign-made component or part, or to have been assembled,
grown, or harvested outside the United States.
The GATT compels fair treatment of all product imports. It
creates an enforcement body, the WTO, to enforce the treaty
proscriptions against non-tariff trade barriers such as unreasonable
local requirements that might be disguised as "health protection"
rules. 6 The WTO has enforcement teeth as a result of its
empowerment by the Uruguay Round amendments to GATT,
117
and these teeth can bite a nonconforming law or rule of a
signatory nation."'
Counsel to the complaining nation will probably use several
sophisticated arguments against Proposition 65 in the WTO. The
private bounty hunter litigation is not a tariff, not a national tax,
and not on its face a source of distinction between points of origin
within California, in the United States, and outside the United
States. The adverse effect on trade is real, but subtle. The
probable WTO case's facts derive from the particular bounty
hunter lawsuit against a particular imported product, and so the
particular approach cannot be specified in advance. The nation
from which the challenged product is exported will file the
complaint at WTO on behalf of its domestic company, the
exporter that is now a defendant in the California state courts.
The United States government will consider its response to the
WTO complaint after consultation with California officials. 9
In GATT terms, nations will allege that their non-U.S.
11 See GATT, supra note 1.
116 See DANIEL ESTY, GREENING THE GATT: TRADE, ENVIRONMENT AND
THE FUTURE 213-15 (1994); see generally LAW & PRACTICE, supra note 9.
11 See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement
of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Final Act, Annex 2; 33 I.L.M. 1225, 1226 (1994)
[hereinafter Settlement Understanding].
n See generally HUDEc, supra note 9; LAW & PRACTICE, supra note 9.
11 See 19 U.S.C. S 3512(b) (1997).
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companies are not given fair national treatment by the United
States because the California companies may much more easily
avoid the peculiar vulnerabilities of Proposition 65 than may those
at a distance.1 20 The free flow of goods is hampered when one
of the fifty states can impose a huge penalty on a shipper which
increases transaction costs. In particular, a non-U.S. company
could not anticipate such costs if it shipped goods to a port other
than the ports in California and the recipient moved the goods to
California. The non-U.S. company may still be held liable under
Proposition 65 due to the notion that the sale of its product in
California should have been foreseeable.12 1 Ostensibly, "doing
business"2 in California triggers an extra label obligation that
is not applicable in the forty-nine other states. The duty to label
exists even where the shipper had no control over the U.S.
importer's distribution practices.
Although transparency' 23 is a virtue in the world trade
system, the content of the obligation to label is not transparent.
Many Proposition 65 cases have involved very tenuous contami-
nant or byproduct claims rather than assertions about intended
ingredients. However, where the belated discovery of a detectable
amount of a listed chemical can trigger private litigation exposing
a company to huge potential liability, requirements cannot be
characterized as transparent. Transparency is also offended by the
per-day penalty scheme. It is usually a year or more after the
obligation to label arises before the shipper learns that its product
is vulnerable, by which time the non-U.S. company may already
have accrued a huge penalty that year. 24
120 See supra Section 3.5.
121 A single intentional sale in California in violation of Proposition 65
merits penalties. See As You Sow v. Crawford Lab., 50 Cal. App. 4th 1859,
1864 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
122 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.6 (West 1992) (stating that
"[n]o person in the course of doing business" may expose a person to a cancer-
causing chemical without first meeting the warning obligations).
123 See Hans van Houtte, Health and Safety Regulations in International
Trade, in LEGAL ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 128, 137 (Petar Sarcevic &
Hans van Houtte eds., 1990) (asserting the importance of "openness and
transparency" and that a nation "should inform other nations about [its] health
and s fety standards").
124 Penalties include $2,500 per day for each of two penalty schemes,
Proposition 65 and "Unfair Business Practices" violations. See CAL. HEALTH




TREA TIES AND FEDERALISM
Proposition 65 is also discriminatory on the basis of informa-
tion flow. Because the law expressly eliminates"2 the kinds of
notice and comment pre-regulation rights that federal rules
have,126 many U.S. organizations and companies pay California
consultants for expert monitoring of the information in order to
anticipate listings and enforcement trends. California's decision
to allow the majority of cases to be brought by private attorneys
further precludes the non-U.S. company from predicting which
chemicals, and at what levels of presence, will be litigated.
Although the GATT permits national health protection
measures and allows nations to adopt necessary sanitary mea-
sures,1V the provision would be offended by the enforcement of
localized liability on the basis of standards that a nation itself has
refused to adopt. Congress has considered but never adopted
Proposition 65-like liability schemes. Federal agencies have not
embraced the Proposition 65 degree of warnings, instead prefer-
ring a risk assessment approach that is far more science-based.
Given a national health protection system in place that does not
rise to the stringency of the Proposition 65 scheme, it may be
difficult for Proposition 65 advocates to convince WTO panels,
while alongside the United States Trade Representative's regular
negotiators, 21 that the law is necessary.
Finally, arbitrariness in target selection may incline a WTO
panel to reject the application of Proposition 65 to the particular
goods in dispute in a particular case. The bounty hunter lawsuit
against the product shipper or manufacturer can only proceed
after sixty days notice to government officials has lapsed with no
public enforcement action against the named companies. 129 The
federal, state, and county public officials' decision not to pursue
this product as a public health risk, thereby leaving enforcement
125 The section of the law providing for notice and comment rights was
repealed in 1988. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE S 25259.8(e) (West 1992).
126 See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1996).
"2 See Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, reprinted in OFFICE OF UNITED STATES TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE, URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIA-
TIONS, GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE 69 (1994) [hereinafter
Sanitary Measures Agreement].
"' States are entitled to consultation but not to negotiate on behalf of the
United States position at the WTO. See 19 U.S.C. S 3512 (1997).
129 See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE S 25249.7(d) (West 1992).
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to the private attorney, is an admission of priorities that is likely
to influence non-U.S. governments from whom the WTO panel
members are drawn. The size of penalties imposed through
private actions, after the governmental entity had itself refused to
pursue penalties against the non-U.S. company, undercuts the
potential claims that the pending Proposition 65 enforcement
action is necessary for the public health of the citizens of
California.
5.1. The Case for GATT Acceptance
Given an opportunity to defend Proposition 65 to the WTO,
proponents of the private attorney general approach to cancer
warnings likely would argue that an individual state made a
conscious choice to have distinct standards of health protection
and that GATT members should accept each state's choices out of
deference to U.S. principles of federalism. They may argue that
greater cancer and reproductive harm information is necessary to
protect the health of state residents, even if federal officials do not
share the state's risk assessment and its level of demand for risk
communication.130
Proponents also may argue that the law results in no trade-
relevant discrimination, since all product sellers in California must
have labels, and thus foreign and domestic firms are equally
vulnerable to penalties. The fact that large penalties against
domestic firms have been imposed indicates the law is not targeted
against non-U.S. shippers of goods."' Proponents of Proposi-
tion 65 may also assert that non-U.S. shippers can arrange to
exclude their products from California, to sticker each container
with a special California label, or to have retailers post a shelf-
specific warning label that is prominent, clear, and durable enough
to be visible when every potential retail customer examines the
130 The Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures states that member nations "have the right to take sanitary and
phytosanitary measures necessary for the protection of human ... health,
provided that such measures are not inconsistent with the provisions of this
Agreement." Sanitary Measures Agreement, supra note 127, art. 2, para. 1.
Member nations must ensure, however, that any such measure is "applied only
to the extent necessary to protect human ... health, is based on scientific
principles and is not maintained without sufficient scientific evidence .... " Id.
art. 2, para. 2.
131 See Stringer, supra note 92.
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imported product.132 However, although it is potentially feasi-
ble to have compliance without labels, in practice only a universal-
ly applied label warning reciting California's opinion about the
product's dangers that is visible on each package when sold in
every state of the United States, will assure that products which
wholesalers and retailers ship to and from their several outlets will
comply with California's law.
5.2. The GATT Safety Exception
The GATT Article XX(b) permission for "measures ...
necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health" is an
exception to the treaty proscription against nontariff trade
barriers. 133  The Proposition 65 label requirement concerns
cancer and other chronic risks.134  In the consultation that
customarily precedes attempts to invalidate laws under
GATT,135 proponents of the law may argue the warning is
necessary and permissible as a sanitary measure under GATT
agreements.
13 6
In order to claim this exception, the proponents of Proposi-
tion 65 likely would argue that information about the presence of
listed chemicals aids consumer choice. They would assert that the
label is not a ban, but a mere informational device. They would
characterize the initiative law as a measure that reflects a "policy
choice" by state voters131 who endorsed the view that disclosure
of chemical risks is necessary to protect the California consumer
from even small exposures to chemicals that may pose health
risks.
GATT also has sanitary and phytosanitary agreements that
112 See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, S 12601(b)(1)(B) (1995). Because the
onerous tasks of sign-posting, maintenance and changes are uncertain while the
liability is stringent, ye ew producers have successfully used means other
than labels to avoid Proposition 65 liabilities.
133 GATT, supra note 1.
134 See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE S 25249.6 (West 1992) (stating that
no person shall expose another to a chemical known "to cause cancer or
reproductive toxicity").
135 See 19 U.S.C. S 3512 (1997).
136 See Sanitary Measures Agreement, supra note 127, art. 2, para. 4.
137 Of course, only those voters who read through to the 86th page of the
ballot pamphlet and the 142d page of the explanatory book at the polling place
before marking their ballot were fully informed as to the "policy" of
Proposition 65. See Proposition 65, supra note 47.
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allow the United States (not individual states) to offer a higher
level of protection than do other nations.'38 Risk assessment
principles are expressly included in the sanitary measures agree-
ments. 139 California uses some international listings of chemicals
as a basis for some of its labeling commands, 14° but the state's
risk assessment judgments for listing have been far more restrictive
than are most federal and foreign national systems. 141 Propo-
nents of Proposition 65 nevertheless would argue that the law is




6.1. Proposition 65 Liability and GATT
Goods imported into the United States from other nations
enjoy the full protection from non-tariff trade barriers that GATT
has established. The effect of Proposition 65's unusual listing
methods, its uncertain risk criteria, and its unpredictable bounty
hunter-created case law, will be a triple threat to any foreign
company entering the U.S. market. The importer attacked by a
bounty hunter begins at a real disadvantage, because the product
selection decisions of California officials are exempt from normal
rulemaking processes.' 43 Very conscientious observers can track
the process by watching specialized trade press outlets.' 44  But
the isolation of the process is compounded by the reality that
many of the cases claiming penalties for an "exposure" have
alleged that the chemical was present as a contaminant, rather
than as an ingredient.' 4
The uncertainty that California's law creates for the makers of
13 See Sanitary Measures Agreement, supra note 127, art. 3, para. 3.
139 See id. art. 5.
140 See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, S 12306(0(1) (1995).
141 For example, California listed Vitamin D at certain levels, while most
other federal and foreign national systems did not.
142 See Zane 0. Gresham & Thomas A. Bloomfield, Rhetoric or Reality: The
Impact of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Federal and State Environmental
Laws, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1143, 1149 (1995).
143 See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.8(e) (West 1992).
144 One such publication is the Proposition 65 News of San Francisco.




TREA TIES AND FEDERALISM
these goods negatively affects trade more than the usual impact of
a conventional tariff decision. A Korean, Thai, or Sri Lankan
shipper of products containing any level of listed chemicals can
either label all packages shipped to the United States with the
California-specific wording, or not do so (through ignorance or
intent) and take the risk of a bounty hunter suit. This is a
difficult decision to make at a distance, upon the shipment of
goods to the United States, since the appearance of goods on a
California retail shelf may occur months after the label is affixed
in a foreign city.
6.2. Will the WTO Panel Accept Proposition 65?
Disputes can only be presented to the WTO by nations against
other nations. As discussed above, only the national governments
participate in the GATT dispute resolution system.1 46 Only the
U.S. Trade Representative can assert a position on behalf of the
United States.1 47 When the U.S. GATT legislation was adopted,
a special consultation process was added to ,preserve state rights of
intervention within the U.S. government.1
4
Despite the consultative power allocated to states by Congress
in the Uruguay Round legislation implementing amendments to
GATT,149 this internal sharing of power has no counterpart in
Geneva when the WTO panel convenes. The fifty individual
states do not have separate capacities to defend GATT complaints
or to invoke a national privilege for a health-related exception to
GATT."s A nation's non-tariff barrier to trade, once alleged to
exist, can only be defended by the federal government. As
discussed above, the national government itself has not adopted a
California-style selection process and warning scheme, and the
individual bounty hunter's lawsuit proceeded only because neither
county nor state officials had become involved. So will the same
146 See supra Section 5.
147 See 19 U.S.C. S 3512 (1997).
148 See id. S 3512(b)(1).
14, See id. S 3512.
150 The WTO procedures are found in the multilateral agreement. See
Settlement Understanding, supra note 117, art. 3, para. 7 (providing remedies
for violation including compensation or suspension of concessions or
obligations); see also Curtis Reitz, Enforcement f the General Agreement on
Tarfffs and Trade, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 555, 588-98 (1996) (discussing
the potential impact of these remedies on a nation that fails to comply).
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government that declines to use a Proposition 65 labeling
approach defend the existence of that approach in a world
adjudicative forum?
A policy decision to defend the validity of Proposition 65
must be made at the federal level, before the WTO panel convenes
to hear the particular allegation of non-tariff trade barriers against
this one state's law. To date, no federal decision about defending
Proposition 65 has been made. The federal regulatory bodies have
not followed California's approach to mandating cancer label
warnings. And many in the scientific community question the
wisdom of the statutory text that arbitrarily fixed the risk level
for reproductive toxicity at 1/1,000 of the level found in the most
potent chemical effects study."5 '
The three WTO members of the panel will be diplomats of
other nations. The political geography of risk assessment should
not be overlooked. If a centralized health authority in the nations
from which WTO dispute-resolution panel judges come does not
believe that chemical X in product Y at level Z requires warnings,
and the U.S. federal government does not impose such a require-
ment, then the state's claim to a power to impose warning labels
on non-U.S. shippers is doubtful. Defenders of Proposition 65's
classification and labeling scheme will face a challenge in confront-
ing WTO panel judges from other nations of the world with
American federalism and the curious concept of "states as
laboratories of democracy."
And to further distance the case from a conventional nation-
to-nation tariff dispute, the trade issue raised by the foreign
government is likely to be presented in the context of million
dollar civil penalty lawsuits by private plaintiffs seeking financial
gain, using the bounty hunter provisions. Because the great
majority of the Proposition 65 cases litigated have been brought
by private sector plaintiffs, the challenge to the non-U.S. product
that precipitates the claim at WTO is likely to arise out of a
bounty hunter claim. The entire set of WTO challenges to date
have been governmental, though some have reflected advocacy for
affected industrial sectors against protectionist activity of their
competitors in the receiving nation."5 2
151 See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE S 25249.10(c) (West 1992).
152 See generally ESTY, supra note 116 (providing a useful description of
WTO cases through 1994).
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This last twist on the unusual setting of this trade dispute has
significance for the WTO panel members from less litigious
nations with a greater tradition of centralized health protection
decisions by national health authorities. The California bounty
hunter proceeds after giving public officials the sixty-day advance
notice required by the statute.153 The state or county then
makes a public agency choice not to adopt the cause of action, but
to leave prosecution of the case to that self-selected private person.
The suit then proceeds as a private person suing another private
entity for the enforcement of the public's right to a label. The
fact that public officials eschewed enforcement in a case that later
comes to the WTO will likely affect the willingness of WTO
panel members to defer to the wisdom of the Proposition 65
scheme.
As a jurisdictional matter, public laws of signatory member
nations intruding on trade rights of trading nations are the proper
subject of WTO proceedingslM4 The Proposition 65 case could
be argued either as a private litigation matter, or as the action of
a "private attorney general" as a surrogate of the state government.
Proposition 65's express rejection of governmental regulatory
schemes will certainly be part of the challenger's argument that
this state law is inconsistent with conventional national risk
assessment systems.
1 55
In the prototypical Proposition 65 lawsuit seeking millions of
penalty dollars from a foreign shipper of goods, neither the U.S.
government nor the California government nor the county
government has chosen to challenge the label of this foreign
product. Yet one-half of the cash generated from penalties on the
foreign shipper come to the state's public officials.15 6  Those
officials are bound by any court interpretations of the law's terms
and application.5 7 So this quasi-public precedential litigation
will be a particularly odd style of non-tariff barriers for the non-
U.S. WTO panel members to accept.
153 See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE S 25249.7(d) (West 1992).
14 See Settlement Understanding, supra note 117 (setting forth the basis and
process of the WTO proceeding).
155 See Proposition 65, supra note 47, S 1 ("[Sltate government agencies have
failed to provide people ... with adequate protection .... ").
156 See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE S 25192 (West 1992).
157 Proposition 65 must be broadly construed so as to permit broader causes
of action. See People ex rel. Lungren v. Superior Court, 926 P.2d 1042 (1996).
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6.3. Will a WTO Decision Override State Law?
Although the laws of a member nation must conform to its
responsibilities under GATT, a WTO decision does not immedi-
ately translate into national action. The U.S. statute implement-
ing GATT recognizes that changes to an inconsistent state statute
require special procedures within the federal system.158 Thus,
even if a WTO panel rejects a U.S. state's imposition of a "known
to California" cancer label on a non-U.S. manufacturer, a foreign
shipper may still incur Proposition 65 liability.
Considerable debate about the effects on U.S. environmental
laws accompanied the controversial congressional adoption of both
the GATT and the North American Free Trade Agreement
("NAFTA"). The dispute resolution mechanisms of GATT were
not welcomed by advocates of states' rights, who won an
important procedural protection."5 9 Congress chose, during its
hot debate over GATT, to preclude affected private persons from
challenging state laws by asserting their inconsistency with
GATT.
60
The U.S. implementation of GATT required the adoption of
a statute, which resulted in a compromise accompanied by a
number of complex safeguards and reservations that attempted to
ameliorate political opponents' concerns in the final wording of
the statute.1 61  States receive rights of notice, consultation, and
participation; only after failure of agreement is there a full judicial
evaluation of the disputed claims.1 62
In practical terms, a complaint or an adverse WTO ruling will
pressure the U.S. government to remove any non-tariff barrier to
trade such as Proposition 65. In bringing a WTO complaint, a
foreign nation will probably aim to halt further enforcement of
the single-state label requirement against that class of imported
products affected by Proposition 65. The private bounty hunter
whose share of the civil penalty is imposed against foreign
importers will vigorously protest any interference with the
expected return, even though the private attorney lacks statutory
15 See 19 U.S.C. § 3512 (1997).
159 See id. § 3512(c).
160 See id.
161 See Pub. L. No. 103-465, 104 Stat. 4815 (1994).




standing, or standing before the WTO.
The legislation that implemented GATT suggests that the
United States may foreclose Proposition 65 enforcement by
initiating litigation in federal court for invalidation of the
statute.163 Consultations with California-elected officials would
precede the federal case, and political opposition may be severe.
The predictable U.S. political infighting over GATT pre-
emption could take a long time, during which the defendant
manufacturer will expend tens of thousands of dollars defending
the bounty hunter's lawsuit. One means of halting a Proposition
65 case in state court might be a "suggestion of interest" interven-
tion by the Justice Department on behalf of the U.S. Trade
Representative. The case might then be removed to federal court,
where the Justice Department could petition the court to stay the
case, pending the outcome of the special statutory proceeding
created by the 1994 legislation.
A defendant company in a Proposition 65 case might ask the
state court to dismiss the case because of the GATT-related
invalidity of Proposition 65 as applied to its imported products.
The success of that claim depends on the receptivity of the state
judiciary to these constitutional claims. The question of treaty
enforcement does not come before state judges routinely, and the
receptivity of state courts to federal pre-emption assertions is
unpredictable. In addition, although a federal cause of action
exists, it does not provide the individual defendant with any
remedy.164
Another way to combat Proposition 65 lies in using the threat
of a WTO case as a premise for seeking legislative changes in
California. 65 Since proponents of Proposition 65 anticipated
legislative attempts to alter its severe sanctions, any change in the
terms of this voter-adopted initiative law requires a two-thirds
vote of each house of the state legislature. 166  The amendment
163 See id. 3512(b)(2)(A).
164 See id. 3512.
165 Proposition 65 permits the legislature to make only those changes to the
initiative law that would "further its purposes." Proposition 65, supra note 47,
§ 7. Under state constitutional law, thelegislature cannot negate an initiative
law's provisions except by a new initiative or by the terms of the particular
initiative itself. See Amwest Surety Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 906 P.2d 1112 (Cal.
1995).
166 See Proposition 65, supra note 47, § 7.
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option, however, is a far less likely remedy than federal court
intervention to block operation of the state law.
6.4. How Will Federal Officials Respond to a GATT Complaint?
Due to the liability that Proposition 65 imposes on importers
of products, a GATT signatory nation could file a complaint
charging the United States with maintaining a non-tariff barrier to
trade. This action would trigger U.S. government consultations
under WTO procedures, and U.S. government consultations with
states under U.S. federal statute." The later process of WTO
decision seeks consensus, but panels reach decisions whenever a
settlement cannot be achieved.16' Three-member panels of the
WTO member nations hear and decide the disputes as part of the
Dispute Settlement Body created by the 1994 GATT Uruguay
Round agreements. 16' They seek an "objective assessment" of
the disputed provisions.170 The system encourages consultations
leading to settlement. 171 So the existence of a challenge is likely
to motivate the U.S. Trade Representative to act against Proposi-
tion 65 under the procedures of U.S. law,72 whether or not the
challenging nation could ultimately prevail in a fully contested
case.
Politics and world trade are commonly linked topics. The real
impact of a GATT violation complaint will be to force federal
officials to choose between short-term political desires, and longer
term selection of targets to be defended in the complex world of
trade sanction conflicts. Whether or not the federal government
could win on the merits at the WTO panel, the existence of any
WTO challenge to Proposition 65 will force the President to
make a choice: to accede to the settlement of the foreign state's
complaint, or to defend against this international trade complaint
based on domestic political priorities.
The GATT's ratification in Congress 73 was a very politically
charged decision. The legislation implementing WTO dispute
167 See 19 U.S.C. S 3512 (1997).
161 See Settlement Understanding, supra note 117, art. 12, para. 7.
169 See Settlement Understanding, supra note 117, art. 8, para. 5.
170 Id. art. 11.
171 See Settlement Understanding, supra note 117, art. 4.
172 See § 3512.
173 See Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4815 (1994).
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resolution rights reflects a sensitivity to this debate. The multi-
step process leading to judicial termination of a state law in
response to a multinational body's command 74 will test the
commitment of U.S. political leadership to implementing their
global agreements. The emotional backlash in states like Califor-
nia against the rise of world governance could be significant.
The legislation implementing the GATT Uruguay Round
directed a consultation process to take place before determination
of the U.S. position on a particular challenge to a particular state
law.75 The President may then choose to expend U.S. power
at the WTO in defense of a state law, or to allow the WTO panel
to order elimination of the state law as a non-tariff barrier to
trade. If the WTO panel decides against the United States, only
the Justice Department is authorized to sue the state to remove
the barrier; no private party can sue to enforce the WTO
decision. 76 Under the U.S. statutory procedure for implementa-
tion of WTO decisions, a federal court would issue an order'77
holding the state's requirements invalid as contrary to internation-
al treaty obligations of the United States.178
The political implications of federal intervention against a
state's voter initiative law, especially for a sitting President eager
for re-election votes from California, will inevitably influence this
policy decision. These factors must be weighed against the
spectrum of complex challenges facing the United States at the
WTO, where the former has a number of economically charged
trade issues of much greater dollar significance.179  Proposition
65, as the only law commanding chronic effects labels across many
products based on presence, not assessment of risk from each
exposure, runs contrary to the federal refusal to impose such
requirements. Is it worth the effort to defend an extreme
program that is primarily enforced by non-governmental bounty
hunters? The U.S. Trade Representative possesses only a limited
amount of bargaining power with which to fight any selected
174 See § 3512.
175 See id. § 3512(b)(1)(C).
176 See id. S 3512(c)(1).
17 See id. § 3512(b)(2)(B)(iv).
178 See id.
179 See generally ESTY, supra note 116 (detailing various trade issues of
significance to the United States in the context of GATI).
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trade issue.180 The choice to federally endorse and fight for a
particular state's approach means that some other U.S. trade issue
will inevitably receive less attention.
The existence of the WTO challenge is a catalyst for decision.
Although any challenge brought by another nation will trigger
consultation between federal and state officials,181 the final
choices are exclusively federal. If the state disagrees, its legal
defense will go to the question of U.S. adherence to WTO
decisions. If a federal district court rejects the WTO decision and
refuses the pre-emption request, the consequence will be a
confrontation of sovereignties and trust that will affect many
other U.S. trading issues. Ironically, the local bounty hunter
attorney who wished to extract a quick settlement payment from
an unsuspecting foreign defendant may end up at the podium of
the U.S. Supreme Court, defending the legitimacy of its cause of
action within the vortex of swirling constitutional conflicts.
6.5. Could a National Risk-Based Rule have Co-existed with
GAT]?
Chemical-specific cancer warning label requirements, if
adopted as consistent federal requirements and enforced by a
federal prosecutorial mechanism, would probably withstand
GATT challenges brought by other nations against the United
States. The national entity, through the U.S. Trade Representative,
could argue that the federal use of risk assessments to protect
consumers was a national "sanitary" regulation under the GATT
sanitary and phytosanitary agreements,12 and was validly ap-
plied to better protect consumers in a very populous state.
In such a situation, the U.S. Trade Representative would also
likely assert that the process for federal listings of chemicals
posing health risks is so readily tracked through the federal notice
and comment rulemaking process,8 and so well grounded in
scientifically accepted risk assessments, that the conditions for
compliance were both transparent and defensible. The transparen-
cy requirement of GATT would likely be satisfied by federal
18o See generally LAW & PRACTICE, supra note 9.
See 19 U.S.C. § 3512(b)(1)(C) (1997).
182 See Sanitary Measures Agreement, supra note 127, art. 2.
183 See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1996).
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Administrative Procedure Act publication requirements."'
7. CONCLUSION
In a world of global trade, localized product label demands at
the sub-national level, such as those in California, pose multi-
million dollar traps for the unwary foreign manufacturer. The
U.S. legal system has not fully reconciled the devolution of power
to the states, with the supremacy and more intensive effects of
international treaties. A predictable collision is ahead.
Although the 1994 federal legislation implementing GATT
amendments envisioned a need for accommodation between state
laws and treaties, the conflicts that will arise when Proposition 65
is challenged at the World Trade Organization will raise daunting
political and legal issues. The voter-adopted nature of the
California warning law, and the strength of California voters'
voice in Congress, makes any pre-emption decision regarding that
law especially controversial. Trade lawyers, states' rights advo-
cates, constitutional scholars, and even the "bounty hunter"
plaintiff lawyers will be watching the results of such a future
challenge with great interest.
"24 See id. S 552(a)(1). The California listings of chemicals are expressly
excluded from the equivalent state law's rulemaking procedures. See CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE S 25249.8(e) (West 1992).
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